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his individual account is not obliged to make inquiries as to the
trustee's authority in this respect but is held free from liability until
such act or acts of the trustee give actual notice to the bank of the
misappropriation of the funds when it must then inquire as to the
disposition being made of the trust funds, or for its failure so to
inquire, it will be held liable to the trust estate.
KATHLEEN M. KANE.
ARBITRATION-EFFECTIVE METHOD OF SETTLING DISPUTES.
The legal term "arbitration" has been defined as the investiga-
tion and determination of a matter or matters of difference between
contending parties, by one or more unofficial persons, chosen by the
parties and called arbitrators or referees.' Mutual promises are a
sufficient consideration for agreements to arbitrate.2 It is essential
that a controversy exist, for in the absence of such, an attempted
arbitration would be no more than an idle gesture. 3
Arbitration as a form of settlement of controversies is an ancient
practice existing at the common law 4 and finding statutory sanction
in this state in the early part of the 19th century. 5 Under the
common law rules an agreement to arbitrate was legal in New York
and damages were recoverable for a breach thereof 6 but specific
performance of the promise would not be enforced; 7 nor could the
agreement be pleaded in bar of an action.8
At the present time arbitration in New York State is well pro-
vided for and regulated by statutes which govern both the principles
'1 WORCEsTER, DICTIONARY, 3 Bla. Com. 16; BLACK, LAW DIcT. (2d ed.
1910) ; BOUVIER (Baldwin's Student's ed. 1928) ; Garr v. Gomez, 9 Wend. 649,
661 (N. Y. 1832); Matter of Berkowitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N. Y. 261,
270, 130 N. E. 288, 290 (1921).
2 Curtis v. Gokey, 68 N. Y. 300 (1877); Wood v. Tunnicliff, 74 N. Y. 38(1878); Green-Shrier Co. v. State Realty & Mortgage Co., 199 N. Y. 65,
92 N. E. 98 (1910).
'N. Y. ARBITRATION LAW, L. 1920, c. 275, art. 2, §2; Toledo S. S. Co. v.
Zenith Transp. Co., 184 Fed. 391, 404 (1911); Matter of Checker Cab Mfg.
Corp. v. Heller, 241 N. Y. 148, 149 N. E. 333 (1925) ; Webster v. Van Allen,
217 App. Div. 219, 216 N. Y. Supp. 552 (4th Dept. 1926).
"N. Y. Lumber & Woodworking Co. v. Schneider, 15 Daly 15 (N. Y.
1888); Titus v. Scantling, 4 Blackf. 89 (Ind. 1835); Miller v. Brumbaugh,
7 Kan. 343 (1871).
W 2 REV. STAT., pt. 3, c. 8, tit. 14, §§1-25, pp. 541-545 (1829); Matter of
Webster v. Van Allen, supra note 3 at 221, N. Y. Supp. at 554.
'Haggert v. Morgan, 5 N. Y. 422 (1851).
'Ibid. People ex rel. Union Ins. Co. v. Nash, 111 N. Y. 310, 18 N. E. 630(1888) ; Finucane v. Bd. of Education, 190 N. Y. 76, 82 N. E. 630 (1907) ;
Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N. Y. 284, 293, 169 N. E. 386,
389 (1929).
'Supra note 6; Finucane v. Bd. of Education, ibid.
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and the procedure.9 Specific performance of arbitration agreements
was made compellable by the statute,' 0 but only as to matters con-
tained within the terms of the agreement." If the arbitrators keep
within their jurisdiction, their award is not subject to judicial
review 12 but is conclusive 13 and enforceable.' 4  However, an order
for the specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate is not part
of the arbitration but is reviewable as a separate controversy.' 5
In general arbitration agreements may be classified under three
types: 10 1. Where in the absence or regardless of any statutory
provision the parties to any controversy submit the decision thereof
to mutually chosen arbitrators; 17 2. Where by statute authority is
given to parties to a controversy not in court to submit the same to
arbitrators and, by agreement, have the submission entered as a rule
of court, and the award enforced, or, on motion entered as the judg-
ment of a designated court; 18 3. Where a court in which a contro-
versy is pending sends it for determination, by consent of the parties,
to arbitrators chosen by the parties or selected by the court.' 9
"Settlements of disputes by arbitration are no longer deemed
contrary to public policy. Contracts to that end are now declared
valid, enforceable and irrevocable save upon grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 20 The challenge
that the arbitration statute is unconstitutional in certain respects has
IN. Y. ARBITRATION LAW, L. 1920, c. 275, Cons. Laws, c. 72, arts. 1-4;
N. Y. C. P. A. §§1448-1465, 1469; N. Y. CITY MuN. CT. CODE, L. 1915, c. 279,
amended to 1931, §6, subd. 6.
11 N. Y. ARBITRATION LAW, ibid. art. 2, §3; Red Cross Line v. Atlantic
Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 118, 119, 44 Sup. Ct. 274, 275 (1924); Matter of
Berkowitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, supra note 1 at 269, N. E. at 289; Matter
of Fletcher, 237 N. Y. 440, 445, 143 N. E. 248, 249 (1924) ; Wenger & Co. v.
Propper S. H. Mills, 239 N. Y. 199, 146 N. E. 203 (1924); Matter of Kelley,
240 N. Y. 74, 78, 147 N. E. 363, 364 (1925).
"Matter of Kelley, ibid.
Perkins v. Giles, 50 N. Y. 228 (1872) ; Fudickar v. Guardian Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 392 (1875).
" Perkins v. Giles; Fudickar v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., both ibid.;
Hoffman v. De Graaf, 109 N. Y. 638, 16 N. E. 357 (1888); Masury v.
Whiton, 111 N. Y. 679, 18 N. E. 638 (1888); Sweet v. Morrison, 116 N. Y. 19,
22 N. E. 276 (1889); Matter of Wilkins, 169 N. Y. 494, 62 N. E. 575 (1902).
"N. Y. ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 9, as amended 1927, art. 2, §4A;
N. Y. C. P. A. §§1455, 1456, 1461, 1463.
"Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N. Y. 284, 169 N. E. 386
(1929).
'I Miller v. Brumbaugh, supra note 4 at 352, 353 (1871).
1' Wenger & Co. v. Propper S. H. Mills, supra note 10; Newburger v.
Lubell, 257 N. Y. 383, 178 N. E. 669 (1931).
" N. Y. ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 9, art. 2, §2; N. Y. C. P. A.
§§1448, 1449.
" N. Y. CITY MUN. CT. CODE, supra note 9.
'"N. Y. ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 9, art. 2, §2; Matter of Berkovitz
v. Arbib & Houlberg, supra note 1; Zimmerman v. Cohen, 236 N. Y. 15, 139
N. E. 764 (1923); Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N. Y. 348, 353, 174 N. E. 706,
707 (1931).
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been repelled. 21 It has been held that the filing of a mechanic's lien
prior to seeking settlement pursuant to an agreement to arbitrate con-
stituted a waiver, of the right to arbitrate 22 but that principle was
not found applicable where the lien was filed pending a determination
of a controversy by arbitration.23 The principles promulgated by
those decisions are now subordinated to §35 of the NEw YORK STATE
LIEN LAW.
24
In a recent New York case 25 the parties to certain transactions
had agreed in writing that any controversy which might arise as to
their account should be determined by arbitration. The defendant
became substantially indebted to the plaintiffs to an amount which
was allegedly confirmed and approved by the defendant. Upon
request of the plaintiffs, the defendant failed to advise whether he
claimed a controversy existed. Fearful lest an action at law be
deemed a waiver of their right to arbitration under the contract or
lest a petition for the appointment of arbitrators might be met with a
claim that no controversy existed, the plaintiffs demanded judgment
declaring no controversy existed and for the amount claimed. In the
alternative the plaintiffs asked that if a controversy existed that it be
submitted to the arbitrators according to the agreement. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint and gave judgment
for the defendant.
It was held that an action at law would not be a waiver of the
right of arbitration, even if the defendant in his answer contested the
debt, but that the parties would then be free to discontinue and obtain
the benefit of the agreement. This statement on first impression
appears to conflict with the determinations in previous cases. 26  In
Zimmerman v. Cohen 27 we .find, "The provision to arbitrate can be
modified by a subsequent agreement based upon a consideration, or
waived or abandoned by the agreement or action of the parties. The
arbitration provision of the contract was abandoned or waived. The
plaintiffs made their election when they brought their action against
"Matter of Berkowitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, supra note 1; Spiritusfabrick
Astra v. Sugar Products Co., 230 N. Y. 261, 130 N. E. 288 (1921) ; Red Cross
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., supra note 10; Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v.
Goldberg, Mass & Co., Inc., 253 N. Y. 382, 171 N. E. 579 (1930).
'Matter of Young v. Crescent Dev. Co., 240 N. Y. 244, 148 N. E. 510(1925).
"Matter of Askowitz, 229 App. Div. 258, 241 N. Y. Supp. 394 (2d Dept.
1930).
"N. Y. LIEN LAW §35 (added by L. 1929, c. 515, §2). "The filing of a
notice of lien shall not be a waiver of any right of arbitration."
Newburger v. Lubell, supra note 17.
Zimmerman v. Cohen, supra note 20; Nagy v. Arcas Brass & Iron Co.,
Inc., 242 N. Y. 97, 150 N. E. 614 (1926) ; Matter of Bauer, 206 App. Div. 423
201 N. Y. Supp. 438 (1st Dept. 1923); Samuels v. Samis, 124 Misc. 35, 207
N. Y. Supp. 249 (1924); STU.RGES, COMMER cIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AwARDs(1930) c. 2, §19, p. 59, §20, p. 71; c. 3, §36, p. 126. Contra: N. Y. Lumber &
Woodworking Co. v. Schneider, supra note 4.
"Supra note 20 at 19, N. E. at 765.
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the defendant ignoring the agreement to arbitrate. The defendant
made his election when he answered, setting up a counterclaim upon
which he asked the court to give judgment against the plaintiffs, gave
notice of trial and procured atf order for the taking of a deposition in
preparation for trial." However, in the current decision the court
was careful to qualify the generality of its statement regarding a
waiver.28
A waiver is an intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a
known right.2 9 From the very definition itself it follows logically
that the mere commencement of an action at law in the absence of
notice that a controversy existed would not be a waiver; for the
plaintiff thereby proceeds under the belief that no controversy exists.
The existence of a controversy is essential in order that a right of
arbitration accrue.30 Therefore, if the plaintiff is of the belief that
no right of arbitration has accrued to him, he cannot be properly
said to waive a right which is not known to him.
It was also pointed out in the case that the plaintiff was not
restricted to an action at law but might petition the court that the
defendant submit to arbitration 31 and if the defendant plead that no
controversy exists, arbitrators will not be appointed but defendant
will be estopped from interposing such a defense thereafter. Obsti-
nate silence on the part of the defendant in answer to the petition
would be interpreted as an assent to the appointment of the arbitra-
tors. The decision is most instructive and impressive of the many
intricacies arising from the trend toward settlement of disputes by
arbitration.
"During recent years arbitration has been more and more resorted
to for the settlement of business controversies." 32 "It has furnished
a ready and inexpensive method of disposing of certain types of
controversies generally with satisfactory results. It has been freely
resorted to by people living in communities remote from frequent
courts and by commercial bodies and organizations where a speedy
decision by men with a practical knowledge of the subject is desired.
Courts in all proper cases should be reluctant to limit the scope of so
useful a remedy." 33
The rapid growth of arbitration as an efficient method of settling
controversies is reflected in the rules of the courts. Recently the
' Supra note 17 at 386, 387, 178 N. E. at 670, "We see no force in the
objection that a waiver or abandonment of the benefits of arbitration could be
inferred from the mere commencement of an action in the absence of notice
that a controversy existed."
Cowenhoven v. Ball, 118 N. Y. 231, 23 N. E. 470 (1890); Draper v.
Oswego Co. Fire Relief Assn., 190 N. Y. 12, 82 N. E. 755 (1907); Clark v.
West, 193 N. Y. 349, 86 N. E. 1 (1908); Alsens A. P. C. Works v. Degnon
Cont. Co., 222 N. Y. 34, 118 N. E. 210 (1917).
z Supra note 3.
N. Y. ARmITRATimo LAW, supra note 9, art. 2, §3.
Matter of Friedman, 215 App. Div. 130, 136, 213 N. Y. Supp. 369, 375
(1st Dept. 1926).
'Webster v. Van Allen, supra note 3 at 221, N. Y. Supp. at 554 (1926).
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Appellate Division, Second Department, added an amendment to the
Trial and Special Term Rules of the Supreme Court of Kings
County,34 which provides for a method of arbitrating certain matters
in the process of litigation. It is suggested that this is a very prac-
tical amendment and one which will, if availed of, as its merit war-
rants, eliminate considerable time, effort and expense to litigants,
lawyers and courts alike. It remains for the members of the bar to
carry the spirit and purpose of such rules and of arbitration in
general into practical effect.
PHILIP V. MANNING, JR.
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS BASED ON FRAUDULENT PROMISES.
Promises made with intent not to perform have been frequently
treated by the courts as actual fraud. A court of equity will not,
under the guise of a constructive trust, enforce a mere oral promise,
void under the statute of frauds. On the other hand, equity will not
permit the statute to be made a cloak for fraud, and if one person has
obtained title to property of another, or in which another has an
interest, by means of an intentionally false and fraudulent verbal
promise to hold or dispose of it for a particular purpose, equity will
not permit him to retain the property and repudiate the promise.1 If
we consider a case where A, having an equity of redemption in land,
enters into an oral agreement with B, the mortgagee, that A will not
attend the foreclosure sale, but that B will attend and bid in the
property and hold it for A's benefit, our problem is whether the
courts will enforce A's rights by way of a constructive trust, after B
so obtains the property and pleads the statute of frauds as a bar to
the enforcement of the oral agreement.
'Amendment to Trial and Special Term Rules, Supreme Court, Kings
County, adding new subdivision "f" to Rule 14, in effect April 1, 1932:
"(f) The Justice assigned to Special Term, Part 2, shall on each
Monday, Wednesday and Friday, between 11 A. M. and 1 P. M., hear
such matters as may be brought before him under the provisions of this
subdivision, which matters shall be known as 'Informal Motions.' In any
action or proceeding in the second Judicial District in which the attorneys
for all parties who have appeared shall appear voluntarily before such
Justice for the purpose of obtaining a ruling or a decision, such Justice
sitting as the court shall hear the parties informally, without presentation
of affidavits, motion papers or proof, and make a ruling or decision
thereupon, which, if desired by either party, may be embodied in a court
order or judgment to be signed and entered."
'Ryan v. Dox, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 440, rev'd, 34 N. Y. 307 (1866) ; Fletcher
v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 114 Misc. 409, 187 N. Y. Supp. 429 (1921), aff'd,
197 App. Div. 484, 189 N. Y. Supp. 453 (1st Dept. 1921) ; Henschel v. Mamero,
120 Ill. 660, 12 N. E. 203 (1887); Gregory v. Bowlsby, 88 N. W. (Iowa) 822
(1902).
